








































































The French Economic Observatory (Observatoire français des conjonctures
économiques – OFCE) is an independent centre for economic forecasting and
research and the evaluation of public policy. Created by an agreement concluded
between the French State and the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques
(Sciences-Po) and approved by Decree 81.175 of 11 February 1981, the OFCE brings
together more than 40 French and foreign researchers. The OFCE's mission is to
“ensure that the fruits of scientific rigour and academic independence serve the
public debate about the economy”. It fulfils this task by conducting theoretical and
empirical work, participating in international scientific networks, ensuring a regular
presence in the media and cooperating closely with the French and European public
authorities. Philippe Weil chaired the OFCE from 2011 to 2013, following Jean-Paul
Fitoussi, who in 1989 succeeded the OFCE founder, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney. Xavier
Ragot has chaired the OFCE since 2014 and is assisted by a scientific council that




Jérôme Creel, Estelle Frisquet, Éric Heyer, Lionel Nesta, Xavier Timbeau.
Editorial Committee
Guillaume Allègre, Luc Arrondel, Frédérique Bec, Christophe Blot, Carole Bonnet,
Julia Cagé, Ève Caroli, Virginie Coudert, Anne-Laure Delatte, Brigitte Dormont,
Bruno Ducoudré, Michel Forsé, Guillaume Gaulier, Sarah Guillou, Florence Legros,
Éloi Laurent, Mauro Napoletano, Hélène Périvier, Mathieu Plane, Franck Portier,
Corinne Prost, Romain Rancière and Raul Sampognaro.
Publications
Xavier Ragot, Publications Director
Sandrine Levasseur, Editor-in-chief
Laurence Duboys Fresney, Editorial secretary
Najette Moummi, Head of production
Contact
OFCE, 10 place de Catalogne  75014  Paris 
Tel. : +33(0)1 44 18 54 24
mail : revue.ofce@sciencespo.fr
web : www.ofce.sciences-po.fr
Copyright registration: September 2018   ISBN: 979-10-90994-08-9
ISSN no. 1265-9576   –   ISSN on line 1777-5647   –   © OFCE 2018
Revue de l’OFCE, 153 (2017)
THE INSTABILITY OF MARKET ECONOMIES1
Franck Portier
University College London 
The modern approach to macroeconomic fluctuations considers that the
economy is fundamentally stable, and fluctuates around a stationary state
because of exogenous shocks. This article presents some thoughts and avenues
of research for a different approach in which the decentralised market economy
may prove to be fundamentally unstable and thus fluctuates both endoge-
nously and exogenously. This has implications for the conduct of
macroeconomic stabilisation policies.  
Keywords: cyclical fluctuations, endogenous cycle, non-linearity
A common narrative of recent macroeconomic history considers
that from the mid-1980s onwards, OECD economies entered a period
of “great moderation” during which macroeconomic volatility was
significantly reduced (Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes & Krause [2005]). This
great moderation would be partly due to smaller shocks and partly to
better policies, particularly monetary ones. According to the same
narrative, the belief in the “end of economic history” would have been
called into question by the 2007 crisis, which would have brought up
to date the financial dimension of economies, as generating shocks and
amplifying fluctuations. Another reading is possible, according to
which the economy has not undergone any major change in its fluctu-
ations since the end of the 1970s.
Before presenting this alternative view, let's ask ourselves how
macroeconomic theory intends to explain fluctuations? One can iden-
tify two alternative approaches. According to the first, the economy is
1. This article takes up considerations developed in my work with Paul Beaudry and Dana Galizia.
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inherently stable, and market forces tend to place it along a relatively
smooth growth path that fluctuates with technological, demographic
and “societal” changes (such as the emergence of digital technologies,
higher life expectancy or female participation to the labour market).
Provided that the conditions for the proper functioning of markets are
guaranteed, if necessary through “structural” policies, stabilisation
policies are essentially useless. Under the second approach, market
economies are fundamentally unstable, moving from expansions to
crises, from periods of overheating to persistent episodes of high
unemployment. Economic regulation is therefore essential to correct
markets failures in the cycle.
1. The Modern Macro-Economic Approach to Fluctuations
Where do we place the modern macroeconomic approach, as
exemplified by Smets and Wouter (2007) for its pre-financial crisis
incarnation and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabant (2015) for its
post-financial crisis one, on a line which goes from “laissez-faire” to the
imperative need to regulate naturally unstable markets? Not surpris-
ingly, somewhere in between. But we believe that these models,
developed in universities and used by central banks and budgetary
authorities are by nature closer to the former view than to the later.
Indeed, these models are essentially based on the idea that a decentral-
ised economy is stable and that market forces by themselves do not
create expansions and recessions. If cycles are observed, it is because
external forces, “shocks”, destabilise a system whose natural tendency
is the return to equilibrium. Why is such an approach dominant in
contemporary macroeconomic thinking? For three main reasons. The
first is that when we zoom out and look at market economies over a
long period (say the last 100 years), the striking feature we observe is
steady growth in real per capita income, not instability, as illustrated in
Chart 1(a). If we exclude the two world wars, we certainly observe fluc-
tuations around the growth path, but these appear relatively minor.
The economy appears to be broadly stable. As Prescott (1999) writes, 
“The Marxian view is that capitalistic economies are inherently unstable
and that excessive accumulation of capital will lead to increasingly
severe economic crises. Growth theory, which has proved to be empiri-
cally successful, says this is not true. The capitalistic economy is stable,
and absent some change in technology or the rules of the economic
game, the economy converges to a constant growth path with the
standard of living doubling every 40 years.“ 
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We defend below the idea that there is a third interpretation,
according to which the economy is globally stable but locally unstable.
The second reason to believe that economies are stable is that in
general equilibrium, under certain regularity conditions that are gener-
ally verified by macroeconomic models, market forces tend to favour
convergence (often monotonous) towards a stationary path (turnpike
theorem). Finally, the third, more practical reason is that a view of the
economy as stable and perturbed by shocks is compatible with linear
dynamic modelling, which greatly facilitates the resolution and estima-
tion of such models, especially when they are stochastic and with
rational expectations. As Blanchard (2014) summarises, 
“We in the field [of macroeconomics] did think of the economy as
roughly linear, constantly subject to different shocks, constantly
fluctuating, but naturally returning to its steady state over time.“
2. Towards a Richer Cycle Modelling
To begin with, it seems to us that focusing on the evolution of real
per capita income can be misleading when one considers cyclical fluc-
tuations. Indeed, one must eliminate the trend to observe fluctuations,
and there is not a indisputable statistical method to separate cycle and
trend. If growth (the trend) is the place where factors of production
(physical capital, knowledge, human capital, population) accumulate,
the cycle is that of variations in the intensity of the use of these factors.
Since Keynes, it is the possibility of under-utilisation of factors (under-
utilisation of capital and unemployment) that distinguishes cyclical
Chart 1. GDP per capita and unemployment rates in four major 
developed economies
Sources: (a) Bolt et van Zanden (2014) and (b) FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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fluctuations from growth. It seems therefore more relevant to consider
the evolution of the employment rate, the capacity utilisation rate or
the unemployment rate to understand the cycles. One advantage of
such an approach is that we are then dealing with series that do not
grow, which makes it possible to circumvent the difficulties inherent to
the trend-cycle decomposition. This is what we do in Chart 1(b) by
showing the evolution of the unemployment rate in Canada, the
United States, France and the United Kingdom. What are we seeing?
Two essential things.
First observation, economies alternate expansions and recessions,
periods of low unemployment and periods of high unemployment in a
quite regular way. We do not clearly see a great moderation from the
1980s onwards, and we do not see such an unprecedented recession
from 2007 onwards. Thus, there is a great regularity in the alternation
of expansion and recession phases, with a cycle length circa ten years.
In a series of recent studies (Beaudry, Galizia and Portier, 2016a,
2016b), we have shown that this regular cycle statistically translates,
for many developed economies, into a peak in the spectral density of
unemployment and in the rate of capital utilisation. This strong cycli-
cality contrasts with the conventional wisdom since Granger (1969),
according to which there are no peaks in the spectral density of the
main macroeconomic aggregates. This absence of marked cyclicality
observed by Granger lead Sargent (1987) to define cyclical fluctuations
not as a cycle but as a set of co-movements between macroeconomic
aggregates. One could rightly say that there are no cycles in the
modern approach to business cycles; no cycles in the sense of no peak
in spectral density, therefore no alternating phases of expansions and
recessions explained by the same propagation mechanism, and inde-
pendently of the shocks that may affect the economy. In contrast, a
cyclical economy would indeed be an economy in which phases of
expansion and recession are linked, caused by each other in the sense
that recession is the bedrock of future expansion. As Schumpeter
writes, “the only cause of depression is prosperity“. There is an ancient
tradition of endogenous cycle modelling (Kalecki, 1937; Kaldor, 1940;
Hicks, 1950; Goodwin, 1951), but it is not found in contemporary
macroeconomic models. The reason for this absence is most certainly
related to the following second observation regarding Chart 1 (b).
Second obervation, if there is a regularity in the cycle, we are far
from a deterministic cycle. A rich modelling of the cycle should there-
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fore take into account the marked regularity of the cycle (as in the
endogenous cycle approaches), but also its unpredictability. It was
undoubtedly the deterministic nature of the cycle in the first genera-
tion of endogenous cycle models, and thus their complete
predictability, that limited their appeal for quantitative macroeconomy.
But combining strong endogenous cyclical forces with shocks, it is
possible to propose an alternative view of the macro-economy of fluc-
tuations. In this alternative view, the economy is inherently unstable,
but probably not explosive, and hit by shocks that are responsible not
for the cycles as such but rather for their unpredictability. This raises the
following question: which market interactions are responsible for insta-
bility? Before discussing this issue, let us spend some time on a more
technical but relevant question, namely the relationship between
stability and instability in linear and non-linear models.
3. Stability, Instability and Non-Linearity
In this section, we present the concepts needed to understand
instability in a non-linear world (see Beaudry, Galizia and Portier
[2016b] for a rigorous discussion). It is convenient to think of macroe-
conomic modelling as a relationship between the present, the past and
expectations of the future. Mathematically, let us write that an endoge-
nous macroeconomic variable Xt , to fix ideas the hours worked per
person, is determined by the equation: 
Xt = Et [F (Xt-1 , Xt+1 , Tt)], (1)
where T  represents an exogenous stochastic variable, Et  is the oper-
ator of mathematical expectation and F summarises all the
mechanisms of the model. The stationary state of the economy is
defined as the value X that satisfies equation (1) when the exogenous
variable is constant at the level T, in other words in the absence of
shocks – i.e. X = F(X, X, T). The steady state is stable if the economy
tends to return to X when it is taken away from it (deterministic version
of stability) or if when the economy is hit by recurrent shocks, it tends
to remain in a neighbourhood of X (stochastic version of stability). In a
linear world, that is, a world in which the function F is linear, these two
concepts of stability are equivalent. To the extent that we do not
observe explosive cycles in the data (see Chart 1 (b)), the estimation of
a linear model such as (1) will lead to the conclusion that the stationary
state is stable. However, the economy can be quasi-cyclical in a linear
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world if, following on single shock, it returns to its stationary state with
oscillations, creating periods of expansion followed by periods of reces-
sion. These oscillations will dampen with time, so that it will take a
repetition of shocks to create fluctuations. The fluctuations will not be
self-sustained, but they can be largely endogenous if the rate of
convergence is slow. However, this is not what estimated macroeco-
nomic models predict. For example, in Smets and Wouters (2017)
model, convergence to the stationary state is essentially without oscil-
lations. Why is that? Because these models do not have strong
mechanisms linking expansions and recessions. A recession only
follows an expansion when negative shocks hit the economy. But the
fact that the economy is expanding today doesn't mean it has a higher
probability of going into a recession tomorrow. There is no causal rela-
tionship between today's expansion and tomorrow's recession.
When strong cyclical mechanisms are introduced (as explained in the
next section) and when the model is allowed to be non-linear, it is
possible that the economy is found locally unstable, in the sense that it
does not return to its stationary state, but globally stable, in the sense
that it remains at finite distance from its stationary state. In such a
configuration, which is the one we obtain in our estimates, there exists
a limit cycle, so that the economy, even without shocks, can oscillate
between phases of expansions and recessions. Without shocks, these
oscillations would be perfectly predictable, and thus not very relevant
to model actual economies. However, in this non-linear environment,
shocks will cause variations in the phase and amplitude of the cycle, so
that it will not be fully predictable. We now discuss which model struc-
ture is likely to generate such stochastic limit cycles.
4. A Macroeconomic Framework with Endogenous Cycles
In Beaudry, Galizia and Portier (2014, 2016b), we develop a theory
that generates stochastic endogenous fluctuations. The basic mecha-
nism is that there are incentives for economic agents to coordinate
their decisions, that is to do the same thing at the same time. In
particular, in an economy where consumers face an uninsurable unem-
ployment risk, one has an incentive to spend more when the others are
spending more, because higher aggregate spending reduces unem-
ployment, thus reducing one's own risk of losing its jobs. When the
others spend more, one can reduce its precautionary savings (or go
deeper into debt) and spends more. In short, one spends more when
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the others spend more. This mechanism, also recently modelled by
Chamley (2014) and Challe and Ragot (2016), can generate cyclical
instability when coupled with a decision to accumulate durable and
real estate assets. The endogenous cycle comes from individually
rational but socially costly behaviour, which justifies public stabilisation
policy. The sequence of expansions and recessions is as follows: at the
end of a recession, the stock of real estate and durable goods is depre-
ciated, so that some agents decide to replete it (replace an old car, buy
a larger or better located apartment), even if the risk of unemployment
is still high. In doing so, increased spending tend to increase output,
employment and thus tend to reduce the risk of unemployment, so
that some other agents are encouraged to reduce their precautionary
savings and spend more, thus creating a cumulative upward effect.
This expansion does not stop when the socially optimal level of
housing and durable goods is reached, because each economic agent
has incentives to spend more, even if everyone rationally predict that
the end of expansion is all the more likely when the aggregate stock of
housing and durable goods is large. But when households eventually
decide to slow down their accumulation by reducing their spending,
they create an increase in unemployment that increases risk and further
reduces spending. The economy then appears to be in demand defi-
cient regime, and it slips into recession, until assets stocks are reduced
enough to bring the recession to an end. The economy then enters
again in an expansionary phase. The cycle can exist without shocks,
and then be totally predictable. But it is likely that the economy is also
affected by events such as changes in perceptions, expectations, tech-
nological change, etc., so that the length and amplitude of the cycle
vary in an unpredictable way. This stochastic limit cycle mechanism is
not a simple theoretical curiosity, and we show in Beaudry, Galizia and
Portier (2017) that estimation of such a model places it in a configura-
tion where such limit cycles exist. Shocks are needed not to create
fluctuations, but to make them less predictable.
5. Implications for Economic Policy
Such a modelling sheds a new light on what should be the best
stabilisation policies in recession phases. Because expansion phases
tend to be too long, the economy almost necessarily finds itself in a
situation of over-accumulation (of capital, houses, durables) at the end
of an expansion. There is therefore some truth in the Hayekian view
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that recessions are needed to “liquidate” the excess capital in the
economy. According to Hayek, supporting aggregate demand in reces-
sions is inefficient, as it only delays the recovery. In support of that
view, no one will argue that in 2008 it was necessary to support
demand in the construction sector in Spain, when almost 30% of the
3.5 million houses built since 2001 were vacant. However, there is no
guarantee that the pace of liquidation determined by market forces will
be socially optimal. In the economy described in the previous section,
it can be formally shown that recessions are inefficiently too severe,
because the effect on unemployment of individual spending decisions
is not internalised. Even if the decrease in expenditure must take place,
the decentralized economy over-reacts, and places itself in a regime of
deficient aggregate demand. A Keynesian policy that supports aggre-
gate demand is desirable. While it will slow the liquidation and prolong
the recession, its benefit will be to reduce unemployment on the way
to the recovery. There is a trade-off between the length and severity of
the recession and there is no evidence that the market is choosing the
right balance between the two.
Such mechanisms, in a non-linear model, also contribute to the
debate on “secular stagnation” launched by Summers in 2013. Decen-
tralized economies work well when they are well below their balanced
growth path: the capital stock (productive capital, housing and sustain-
able) is low relative to the level of technology, unemployment is low,
the economy is growing. But when the economy becomes prosperous
and fluctuates around its stationary growth path, needs are largely
satisfied (not in absolute terms, but relative to the level of technology)
and the economy then evolves in a very different area of high unem-
ployment, hence insufficient demand and endogenous cycles. It is in a
way the fate of prosperous economies to oscillate endogenously and
be chronically in deficit of demand.
If the pace of technology decreases, the economy finds itself in
excess of capital (relative to this new technology path), and thus by the
mechanism previously described, in a situation of structural demand
deficit. This structural demand deficit cannot however be absorbed by
a policy that supports aggregate demand, since it is precisely the past
level of demand and the large accumulation of assets that is the cause
the recession: supporting demand means increasing accumulation,
and thus ultimately aggravating the causes of the demand deficit.
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